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The New Orleans National wants the President to follow the example of the Emperor of Russia—to go to the wars, and take command in person of our army in Mexico.

FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

## Despatches from Maj. Downing.

CITY OF MEXICO, UNITED STATES, 27 SEPTEMBER 1847.

MR. GALE & SEATON: My dear old friends, I'm alive yet, though I've been through showers of balls as thick as hail-stones. I got your paper containing my letter that I wrote on the road to the war. The letters I wrote afterwards, the guerillas and robbers are so thick, I think it is ten chances to one if you got 'em.—Some of General Scott's letters is missing in the same way. Now we've got the city of Mexico annexed, I think the Postmaster General ought to have a more regular line of stages running here, so our letters may go safe. I wish you would touch the President and Mr. Johnson up a little about this mail-stage business, so they may keep all the coachesmakers at work, and see that the farmers raise horses as fast as they can, for I don't think they have any idea how long the roads is this way, nor how fast we are gaining south. If we keep on annexing as fast as we have done for a year or two past, it wouldn't take much more than half a dozen years to get clear down to Fother end of South America, clear to Cape Horn, which would be a very good stopping place; for then, if our Government got into bad sledding in North America, and found themselves in a bad dilemma that hadn't no horn to suit 'em, they would have a horn in South America that they might hold on to.

I hope there ain't no truth in the story that was buzzed about here in the army, a day or two ago, that Mr. Polk had an idea, when we got through annexing down this way, of trying his hand at it over in Europe and Africa, and round there.—And, to prevent any quarrelling beforehand about it on this side of the water, he's going to agree to run the Missouri compromise line over there, and cut Europe into free States and Africa into slave States. Now, I think he had better keep still about that till we get this South America business all done, and well tied up. It isn't well for a body to have too much business on hands at once. There's no knowing what little flurries we may get into yet, and there's always danger if you have too much sail spread in a squall. However, I haven't time to talk about this now.

You will get the accounts of the battles in General Scott's letters, so I needn't say much about them. But it's been a hard up-hill work all the way from Vera Cruz here; and I don't think my old friend General Jackson himself would have worked through all the difficulties and done the business up better than General Scott has. But the killed and wounded, the dead and dying, scattered all along the way for three hundred miles, it's a heart-aching thought. I don't love to think about it. It is too bad that we didn't have more men, so as to march straight through without fighting, instead of having just enough to encourage the enemy to bring out their largest armies and fight their hardest battles.

One of the hardest brushes we had, after I got here, was the attack upon Chapultepec. I had been into the city trying to bring Santa Anna to terms; but when I found it was no use, I came out and told General Scott there was no way but to fight it out, and, although I was only the President's private ambassador, I didn't like to stand and look on when he was so weak-handed, and if he would tell me where to take hold I would give him a lift. The General said he expected there would be a hard pull to take Chapultepec, and as General Pillow was placed where he would be likely to have the heaviest brunt of it, I might be doing the country a great service if I would join in with General Pillow, as my experience under General Jackson and insight into military affairs would no doubt be very useful to that valiant officer. So I took hold for that day as one of General Pillow's aids.

When we come to march up and see how strong the enemy's works was, says I, General Pillow it is as much as all our lives is worth to go right straight up and storm that place in the face and eyes of all their guns; I think we ought to fortify a little. Suppose we dig a ditch round here in front of the enemy's works. At that the General's eyes flashed, and he swore right out. Says he, "No, d—n the ditches, I've no opinion of 'em; they are nothing but a bother, and never ought to be used. The best way is to go right into the enemy pell mell." So, on we went, and Pillow fit like a tiger till he got wounded, and then the rest of us that wasn't shot down had to finish the work up the best way we could.

The long and the short of it is, we fit our way into the city of Mexico and annexed it. Santa Anna cleared out the night before with what troops he had left, and is scouring about the country to get some more places ready for us to annex. When he gets another place all ready for

the ceremony, and gets it well fortified, and has an army of twenty or thirty thousand men in the forts and behind the breastworks, we shall march down upon 'em with five or six thousand men and go through the flury. After they have shot down about half of us, the rest of us will climb in, over the mouths of their cannons, and annex that place; and so on, one after another.

It is pretty hard work annexin' in this way; but that is the only way it can be done. It will be necessary for the President to keep hurrying on his men this way; to keep our ranks full, for we've got a great deal of ground to go over yet.—What we've annexed in Mexico, so far, isn't but a mere circumstance to what we've got to do.

Some think the business isn't profitable; but it's only because they haven't ciphered into it for enough to understand it. Upon an average, we get at least ten to one for our outlay, any way you can figure it up.—I mean in the matter of people. Take for instance, the city of Mexico. It cost us only two or three thousand men to annex it, after we got into the neighborhood of it and we get at least one hundred and fifty thousand people in that city, and some put it down as high as two hundred thousand. Some find fault with the quality of the people we get in this country, just as if that had any thing to do with the merits of the case. They ought to remember that in a Government like ours, where the people is used for voting, and where every nose counts one, it is the number that we are to stand about in annexin, and not the quality, by no means. So that in the matter of people we are doing a grand business. And as to the money, it is no matter what it costs us, for money grows in the ground in Mexico, and can always be had for digging.

There's a thousand things in this country that I should like to tell you about if I had time; but things is so unsettled here yet, that I have rather a confused chance to write. So I must break off here, and write a few lines to the President, but remain your old friend, in all latitudes, clear down to Cape Horn.

MAJOR JACK DOWNING.

To James K. Polk, President of the United States, and all Annexed Countries.

DEAR SIR: I've done my best according to your directions, to get round Santa Anna, but it is all no use. He's as slippery as an eel, and has as many lives as a cat. Trist and I together can't hold him, and Scott and Taylor can't kill him off. We get fast hold of him with our diplomats, but he slips through our fingers; and Scott and Taylor cuts his head off in every town where they can catch him, but he always comes to life in the next town, and shows as many heads as if he had never lost one. I had a long talk with him in the city, and pinned him right down to the bargain he made with you when you let him into Vera Cruz, and asked him why he didn't stick to it. He said he did stick to it so far as circumstances rendered it prudent.

"But," says I, "General Santa Anna, that ain't the thing; a bargain's a bargain; and if a man has any honor he will stick to it. Now," says I, "didn't you agree, if the President would give orders to our Commodore to let you into Vera Cruz, didn't you agree to put your shoulder to the wheel and help on this annexin business, so as to make easy work of it?—And now, I ask you, as a man of honor, have you done it?"

"Circumstances alters cases, Major," says Santa Anna. "When Mr. Polk and I had that understanding, he thought he needed a few more votes than he could muster in his own country to bring him into the Presidency for a second term. So we agreed, if I would turn over the votes of Mexico to him to bring him in another term, he would afterwards turn over his part of the votes in North America to me, so as to bring me in next time. But I soon found it would be throwing our labor away, for Mr. Polk's part of the votes in his country was getting so small that they wouldn't do much good to either of us. So I concluded to hold on to what I had got, and stick to the Presidency of Mexico."

"Then," says I, "you ain't going to stick to your bargain, are you?"

"No," says he, "circumstances alters cases." Then I tried to scare him out of it. I told him our folks would whip the Mexicans all into shoestrings in a little while. And it made no odds whether he fit for annexin or against it, we should go on just the same, and before another year was out Mr. Polk would be President of every foot of Mexico; for we should get through annexin the whole of it.

"Very well," says he, "go on; the Mexicans like the business; they can stand it longer than Mr. Polk can; for Mr. Polk will have all the work to do over every year as long as he lives, for there isn't a place in Mexico that will stay annexed any longer than just while you are holding on to it."

So you see there's no doing any thing with Santa Anna. What course it is best to take, now seems rather a puzzle.

haven't time to give you my views about it in this despatch, but will try to soon. Give my love to Mr. Ritchie. I meant to write him too, but I shall have to wait till next time.

Your faithful friend and private ambassador.

MAJOR JACK DOWNING.

From the National Intelligencer.

## The Prospect before us.

Even since the emission of our paper of yesterday we have confirmation of the determination of the Executive—having done nothing within the last eight months but place the country in a more difficult pass in regard to the Mexican War than it stood in when Congress last adjourned—not to wait the first short weeks which intervene before Congress will again be in session, but to take such measures as in its high and mighty wisdom and power it deems expedient for the permanent occupation of Mexico! Truly did the organ of the Government (the Official Gazette) predict, twelve months before the President brought on the war, not only the war itself, but the "SECOND CONQUEST OF MEXICO." Already we are so deeply in for it, that all the attention of our National Government at this moment is absorbed, instead of in the proper affairs and interests of this People, in providing for the final conquest and government of a great Nation, between whom and the United States, when it pleased our President to go to war with it, there existed, unrepented and still unbroken, a Treaty, the fundamental article of which was that "there shall be a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, in all the extent of their possession," &c.

The objects for which this Government was established have no relation to such a state of things as this conquest and proposed permanent occupation of Mexico. The Constitution of the United States confers no such powers upon Congress, much less upon the Executive, as those which the President has exercised ever since Congress last adjourned, and was indeed preparing to exercise whilst Congress was yet in session.

But, not to transcend our present purpose, let us introduce to our readers the evidence which we now have of the present designs of the Executive. They will be found in the following extracts, the first of which is of precisely equal authority with the Correspondence of the Philadelphia Ledger, which we have frequently had occasion to speak of, and the second of which is from a source always much to be relied upon:

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE BALTIMORE SUN.

"Washington, Oct. 26, 1847. "Sufficient intimations have been thrown out in regard to the orders recently sent to Gen. Scott to convince me that he has been directed—1st. to trouble himself no longer about truces, armistices, negotiations, or protocols; 2d. to leave undisturbed the shadow of a Government now at Queretaro; 3d. to prepare for permanent occupation; and for tranquillizing the country; 4th. to disarm the whole population of the cities and country on the road from Vera Cruz to Mexico; and break up and destroy their arms; and, 5th. to levy contributions upon the principal cities and States."

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE.

"Washington, October 25. "The Government sends frequent messages to Gen. Scott. A messenger [Mr. Tasistro] left this morning with despatches for him. I learn from various sources, that the Administration has given such orders to Gen. Scott as will prevent him from again offering or accepting an armistice, or inviting the Mexican Government to make peace.—The day has gone by, too, for offering any pecuniary inducements to the Mexicans, or rulers, or compensation for territory."

Just at the moment of meeting with these consentaneous indications from Headquarters of our Government, we received also the New Orleans "Delta" of the 19th of this month, containing a letter from its correspondent at the Headquarters of our army in the city of Mexico, under date of September 17th. The "Delta"—itself always under the delusion which, more fatal to the public welfare than its annual pestilence to individual health, seems to pervade almost the entire population of New Orleans, that it will be not only politic but honorable in the United States to occupy the whole of Mexico, and eventually seize and possess as much of it as the most rapacious "annexationist" wants—testifies to the intelligence of its correspondent, and to his opportunities of acquiring such correct information as entitles his opinions to great weight. The views of one thus vouched for, as disclosed in the following extracts, appear to us to be of this moment of the greatest consequence, and we lose no time therefore in laying them before our readers, and entreating their earnest attention to them:

Extracts from the correspondent of the

"Delta," writing from the city of Mexico, under date of September 17th.

"The attitude of affairs by which we are surrounded leave us but one of two alternatives, to wit: military occupation and government of the country, or to fall back upon the base of our operations, take up our boundary line, and hold the harbors of the country until Mexico, tired of her oppressed condition, sues for peace to relieve her from the chains which bind her upon the Gulf and the Pacific; annexation of the States of Mexico, Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis, Guanajuato, Guadalajara, or any other of those popular States included in the line drawn from Vera Cruz to the Pacific, being totally out of the question, and one of the greatest follies ever propagated. If we did annex them the North never would consent to the existence of slavery in any of them, and to allow them all the rights and immunities which we as free citizens enjoy, would bring about a state of affairs which would endanger the existence of our own free institutions, and so disturb the equilibrium of the movements of our Government as to make us rue the day we ever put foot upon the soil of Mexico. The people are totally and wholly unprepared, by habits, education, and nature, for exercising those high and important duties required by civilization and a free and liberal Government."

"The system of church government at present exercised here would have to be admitted and continued, or we would have to encounter a foe more formidable in its resources, more powerful in its combats, than all the brilliant bayonets, glittering swords, and death-dealing artillery over which we have already triumphed. A war of religion is one of those wars which is never ended until one or the other of the parties is exterminated, or so enfeebled as to be unable to offer resistance; and in a country so thickly populated as this it would inevitably be the result. Therefore, in view of things as they actually exist, I take it for granted that annexation of this section of this country is totally impracticable, and those who have been its advocates in the United States—myself, to some extent, among others—are ignorant of the difficulties our Government would have to encounter, and the endless trouble and exasperation it would lead to."

"Military occupation and government of all the country we have conquered, to my mind offers no fewer objections than annexation. According to the opinions of the persons in this army whose views, by their acknowledged ability, are entitled to the most weight, it would take an army of at least one hundred thousand men to occupy and garrison the different States and military posts. How long would it take us to get this force equipped and in the field? The President last winter called for ten additional regiments, (ten thousand men), and although it was during the short session of Congress, a portion of the troops have not yet arrived, and those which have come did not arrive at the seat of operations until the month of August. They were enlisted for the war, under the excitement of active operations and a spirited campaign. Now that the excitement of the campaign has ended, that the next session of Congress is a long one, how long will it take us to throw into this country one hundred thousand troops, when they know that their life is to be the dull monotony of the garrison? But admitting, for the sake of argument, that they could be sent here by the expiration of one year, is a standing army of one hundred thousand men in consonance with the spirit of our republic and free institutions? Would it move with the same simplicity and regularity our old army has? Would the military profession retain its present ability, its scientific attainments, its dignity, and its high character, by being so suddenly enlarged to one hundred thousand? I think I may safely answer, no. Again: how would this large army have to be supported? Will the people of the United States consent to supply a revenue for its support? Will they consent to any further and permanent enlargement of the public expenditures for the sake of holding a territory from which they would derive very little benefit for years to come? If we may judge of the aversion of the people of the United States to high taxation, high duties, unproductive expenditures of the public treasure, I think I may be safe in concluding that they never will consent to the support of a standing army sufficient to garrison and occupy that portion we have already, and what of necessity we would have to conquer."

"Let us examine the other alternative, and see if our interests do not require that we should fall back upon the base of our operations, and, if nothing more, await the disposition of the American Congress. We are here, and for the present isolated from the Government and the rest of the army. From the time the army set foot on the Rio Grande we have had nothing but a succession of brilliant victories—we have penetrated the very heart of Mexico with four different columns, and from each point there has been a triumphal march—the stars and stripes have never as yet suffered a defeat."

"The valor and superiority of our own arms have been established beyond question or doubt—Mexico has been humbled and degraded in the eyes of the world, while our own brilliant achievements stand up prominently as a precedent in the annals of the world, to be admired and boasted of when the actors themselves shall lie mouldering in the dust. National and personal ambition has been satisfied. The nation will be proud of the trophies and those who won them.—But with our successes we have arrived at the end of our rope; the capital has fallen, and there is nothing to offer us any further resistance. The President, Gen. Santa Anna, has abdicated the Presidency, and the commander of the army left, with a small body guard, for parts unknown, and is now in fact a flying fugitive—the army of 32,000, which they had when we arrived before the city, does not now number over 3,000, without means of support, and deserting every day. Can our army do any thing more—could it be expected to have done any thing more? Now there is no new enterprise which offers itself, and there is no Government with which we can arrange our difficulties. Therefore, I would ask, if we had not better pick up our wagons as soon as we are able to be moved, and fall back upon the base of our operations, and await the action of our Government? Then our wounded and sick could be better provided for, and our army better and cheaper supplied and placed in good quarters—the volunteers sent home—the regulars drilled, and the regiments filled up and prepared to occupy the boundary we may determine. This course of policy, in my opinion, considering the existing circumstances, is preferable on more accounts than one. It leaves the Government at home in a position to carry out its views with facility and without delay. It would leave the army in a position as convenient in point of transportation, to the occupation of our boundary, as though it were a barracks in the United States."

## FROM MEXICO.

### INTERESTING NEWS.

We copy from the New Orleans Courier the subjoined extract of a private letter, which the Courier states to be "from a high source of military information," and says that "every word of it may be implicitly relied upon." Besides recapitulating the victories obtained by Gen. Scott on his way from Puebla to the city of Mexico, it gives the amount of force with which he commenced his march, and the number of lives lost on both sides during the insurrection which followed the entrance of our army into the capital:

CITY OF MEXICO, SEPTEMBER 19, 1847.

MY DEAR FRIEND: At last we are in possession of the capital of Mexico, and snugly quartered in the far-famed "Halls of Montezuma."

Believing that it will interest you to understand the principal movements of our army since it left Puebla, as I am conversant with them all, I will relate them, and you will find them among the most interesting operations of war that have occurred during the nineteenth century.

When Gen. Scott had completed his arrangements and concentrated his forces at Puebla in the early part of August, and when he saw the sudden disappearance of the speck of peace which had been held out to him and Mr. Trist, he at once determined to move his whole available force upon the capital, by which demonstration he hoped to compel the Mexicans to accept our offer of peace.

Accordingly, our advance division (Twigg's 2,600 regulars) took up the line of march in the morning of the 7th of August; the divisions of Quitman, Worth, and Pillow, (2,300 regulars, 5,200 volunteers) following in the above order, and at intervals of twenty-four hours.

We expected little or no resistance until we reached the valley of Mexico, nor did we meet any. We encountered strong natural fortifications at and in the vicinity of Rio Frio. But the enemy seemed to hold himself in reserve for the determined resistance our army met with after passing that region, midway between Puebla and this city, and after we had entered the valley of Mexico.

The reconnaissance of our engineers and information derived from other sources induced Gen. Scott to make his first demonstration upon the Pinon, so called—a height very strong by nature and doubly so by the science of the Mexicans, who left nothing undone to make the position impregnable. A further reconnaissance satisfied Gen. Scott and induced him to believe that the Pinon could be turned by the flank; which was accordingly done, and we retired from Ayotla, passed through Chalco, and, after innumerable difficulties, reached San Augustine, ten miles from the capital, on the 18th August.

Worth's division was thrown forward a league to San Antonio on our right, and Gen. Pillow, with Cadwalader's and Shields's brigades, and Twigg's division on our left.

Worth's division was much annoyed by the enemy's guns at San Antonio as we were trying to turn that position, when a brisk cannonade was carried on by the troops under Gen. Pillow against the enemy's batteries at Contreras. In the morning of the 20th August, Riley's brigade of regulars, supported by Cadwalader's brigade, assaulted the strong works, while the rifles stood ready to flank, and at a signal one rush was made, the works carried, twenty-two guns (some eighteen-pounders and O'Brien's guns taken at Buena Vista) captured, and also eleven hundred prisoners, sixty wagon loads of ammunition, three hundred pack mules, and eighteen thousand dollars in money, besides killing more than seven hundred men; and all this was done in seventeen minutes by the watch, with a loss on our part of only forty-seven men killed and wounded.

Leaving our prizes, Shields's brigade pursued the enemy to Talpan, followed by all the troops under Pillow; when Gen. Scott ordered Twigg's by one road, Pillow by another, and Worth, by a third, to advance upon the enemy, then in large force and strong position (18,000 men) at Churubusco, and the *tete du pont* near by.

Worth drove the enemy from San Augustine, who fled to *tete du pont*. At these places on obstinate resistance was made for two hours and more, when the enemy fled to the city, followed by the dragoons and light troops to the very gates, leaving upwards of three hundred dead and one thousand prisoners, besides a dozen guns and large quantities of fixed ammunition. Our loss was about one thousand and forty killed and wounded. Here we captured about sixty of our deserters, fifty of whom were hanged last week.

In these three fights we lost many of the best and noblest officers in the service.

General Scott wisely recalled the troops as, by entering the city, (which could most readily have been done), the authorities would have been dispersed, and all chances of peace dispelled forever.

On the 21st General Mora, chief engineer of Mexico, came out, and meeting Gen. Scott at Colcahan, made propositions for a truce. The advance of the army moved to Misquaka and Tacubaya, and on the 24th a truce was signed, and Mr. Trist met the four Mexican Commissioners, when negotiations were commenced.

During the first four days of the truce there were so many palpable violations of it, in stoning our teamsters, murdering our men, receiving reinforcements, laboring on their forts, &c., that, finally, on the 6th September, Gen. Scott demanded explanation, apology, and redress, or the reopening of hostilities. Santa Anna having sent an undignified and impertinent answer to Gen. Scott on the 7th, Gen. Worth, with 2,200 regulars, assaulted the mill of San Salvador, defended by the Mexican army, 16,000 men, commanded by Santa Anna in person, drove the whole of them from the field, blowing up the foundry at the mill, taking six guns, a good supply of ammunition, seven hundred prisoners, and killing and wounding two thousand five hundred Mexicans.—Our loss was about seven hundred killed and wounded.

By the morning of the 12th September our engineers had made a reconnaissance of every position; and, while Twigg's division was making a strong demonstration at the San Antonio gate, Gen. Scott had matured his plans to take the strong castle of Chapultepec by assault.

The 12th was occupied in bombarding this castle, and in the morning of the 13th five hundred picked men, supported by Quitman on our right, Pillow in the centre, and Worth on our left, carried Chapultepec at the point of the bayonet. At this place we killed some three or four hundred, and took above three hundred prisoners and an immense quantity of ammunition. A Mexican was killed in the act of setting fire to three mines, with the intention of blowing up the castle and killing every soul in it. Gen. Smith's brigade joined Quitman's division in this fight. Riley's brigade was ordered up from the San Antonio gates.

Having secured our prizes, Quitman's division and Smith's brigade (Riley's subsequently joined) took the Tacubaya road, while Pillow's and Worth's divisions took the San Cosme road, and pursued the enemy to the gates of the city, which after some fighting were carried. At these places our loss was very great, but it is not yet ascertained.—Worth's division dug their way half a mile through stone walls, took to the house-tops, and carried every thing before them. Santa Anna, knowing that next morning we would drive him out, evacuated the city with all his army, and on the 14th we took possession of the palace.

On the morning of the 14th September General Scott and staff entered the city, and after reviewing the troops were escorted to the palace.

As the troops were about to move to their quarters, a large body of leperos commenced firing on our men from the house-tops, and a general street fight ensued, which was kept up two days and nights.